By: Maria Ceriotti
Ramirez v. Collier, 21-5592 slip op. (2022)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) was enacted in 1996 primarily to reduce prisoner litigation.1 The passage of the PLRA led to a decrease in the number of cases filed in federal court by prisoners.2 However, there is also evidence that suggests that even meritorious claims are barred from federal court based on technicalities through a failure to comply with the PLRA.3 While the initial intent of the PLRA was to prohibit the increasing flow of frivolous suits by prisoners at the time, the consequences have been dire for prisoners seeking redress for meritorious claims that fail to meet the PLRA’s high standard of exhaustion.4
The PLRA requires that an inmate “exhaust” all possible administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.5 The exhaustion requirement produces only complaints which can be resolved by the court system because they have not been remedied by any other administrative procedure.6 While this positive effect frees the burden on the court’s docket, it also has the negative consequence of barring claims which may be fit for federal court but for a mistake following the procedural requirement of the PLRA.7 These effects may present themselves in multiple different factual circumstances. In Ramirez v. Collier, the Court was faced with the question of whether a spiritual advisor’s presence in the execution chamber was constitutionally protected under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).8 The Court’s opinion seems at first glance to be only a win for broader religious freedom rights.9 However, upon closer reflection at the distinctions between the majority and dissent, the Court’s biggest implication from their holding will be a less restrictive pathway for incarcerated persons to utilize the judicial system.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On July 19, 2004, Pablo Castro was working the night shift at the Times Market convenience store in Corpus Christi, Texas.10 While closing up the store, John Ramirez and two other accomplices approached Castro with a knife.11 Ramirez stabbed Castro twenty-nine times with a knife and took $1.25 from Castro’s pockets.12 Castro later died outside the store from the wounds.13 While the other two accomplices were captured, Ramirez fled to Mexico and was not apprehended until three years later at the U.S.-Mexico border.14 A jury subsequently found Ramirez guilty of murder while committing or attempting to commit a robbery, which is a capital offense subject to the death penalty.15 The jury sentenced Ramirez to death, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the sentence.16 All of Ramirez’s subsequent appeals on his conviction and sentence were also denied.17
Texas scheduled Ramirez’s execution for February 2, 2017.18 Less than one week before execution, Ramirez moved for a stay of execution and argued that his counsel had been constitutionally ineffective.19 While the claim was rejected by the District Court, it did delay the execution, which was set for a new date on September 9, 2020.20
Prior to the execution, Ramirez requested to have his pastor, Dana Moore, present in the execution chamber.21 Prison officials denied the request based on a protocol that barred all spiritual advisors from entering the chamber, regardless of religion.22 Ramirez then filed suit, arguing that the protocol violated both his First Amendment rights and his rights under RLUIPA.23 The request stated that Ramirez wanted his pastor “to be present at the time of his execution to pray with him and provide spiritual comfort and guidance in his final moments,” but also explicitly noted his pastor “need not touch [him] at any time in the execution chamber.”24 The suit was dismissed without prejudice when Texas withdrew the current death warrant before further filings.25
Texas then informed Ramirez that his new execution date was scheduled for September 8, 2021.26 Because the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all local and state remedies before filing suit, Ramirez followed Texas’s 2021 Execution Protocol by submitting a Step 1 prison grievance.27 This grievance requested that a spiritual advisor be allowed in the chamber at the time of execution and was denied by Texas.28 However, Ramirez’s request was later accepted due to Texas’s amended protocol allowing for spiritual advisors to be present in the execution chamber when accompanied by a security escort.29
On June 11, 2021, Ramirez filed another grievance which requested the pastor be permitted to “lay hands” on him and “pray over” him at the time of execution.30 Texas denied this subsequent request and said spiritual advisors were not allowed to physically touch the inmate, although nothing in the protocol explicitly denied such actions.31 Ramirez, following the protocol, then filed a Step 2 grievance to appeal the decision on July 8, 2021.32 Since the appeal was still not answered with less than one month before the scheduled execution, Ramirez filed suit in federal district court.33 Ramirez alleged that the refusal to allow his pastor to lay hands and pray aloud over him at the time of execution violated his First Amendment rights and his rights under RLUIPA.34 He sought a preliminary and a permanent injunction to stay his execution until the religious accommodation was granted.35
Both the District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the stay of execution.36 The Supreme Court then stayed the execution, granted certiorari, and heard oral argument on an expedited basis.37 The Court held that a preliminary injunction should be enforced if Texas did not accommodate the request since Ramirez’s claim was likely to succeed on the merits under RLUIPA.38
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are two statutes—the PLRA and the RLUIPA—at issue in this case, each more fully described by subsequent case law litigating the nuanced aspects of their language and intent. The PLRA requires all incarcerated individuals to exhaust all available administrative remedies to resolve their complaints before filing in federal court.39 The RLUIPA covers both land use for religious purposes and the religious rights of institutionalized people, including incarcerated individuals.40 Both of these statutes are analyzed in the current case due to the injunctive remedy sought.41 Further, a brief overview of the requirements of preliminary injunctive relief as detailed in Winter v. National Resources Defense Council via four factors is necessary to understanding the PLRA and the RLUIPA.42
The PLRA requires that prisoners exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing suit in court.43 This can be done following the grievance protocol of the prison, which requires prisoners to give a written description of the complaint.44 If there are subsequent steps for appeals through the warden, those too must be taken.45 In order to “exhaust” all the remedies, each claim must be raised in the grievance process and against each defendant the prisoner wants to raise the claim against.46
Under the RLUIPA, it is the plaintiff’s burden to first show that the policy of the prison implicates a religious exercise.47 Additionally, the belief must be sincerely held by the plaintiff.48 A variety of evidence may be used to show the sincerity of the belief, with one frequent indicator being whether the exercise is traditional to religious practice.49 Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the burden then moves to the government to prove that the policy (1) furthers a compelling state interest, and (2) that the policy is narrowly tailored to that interest.50 If the state can do so, then the policy does not violate the RLUIPA or the rights of the prisoner granted via the Free Exercise clause.51
The Court uses four factors for identifying whether the plaintiff should receive equitable relief in the form of a preliminary injunction.52 Commonly referred to as the Winter test, the four factors include: (1) plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, (2) plaintiff’s likelihood to suffer irreparable harm, (3) the balance of the equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) the injunction is in the public’s interest.53 In order to receive injunctive relief, the plaintiff must generally meet all four factors.54 The first factor requires the court to assess the claims made by the plaintiff against the defendant,55 and while it does not rule on the complaint itself, this factor provides helpful insight into the future outcome of a claim. For irreparable injury to be present, the plaintiff’s legal remedies must either not exist or be very difficult to measure.56 Finally, this analysis is conducted with the facts of the case only and does not look to the potential future repercussions of future similar claims.57
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Majority held that Ramirez did exhaust all his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA and that his case was likely to succeed on the merits under the RLUIPA.58 The dissent, however, found that Ramirez did not exhaust all his remedies and instead was using the system to delay his execution.59
1. Justice Roberts’s Majority Opinion
The argument presented by the State contained two main parts: (1) Ramirez could not be granted any relief because he did not exhaust all his options as required by the PLRA, and (2) the claim is likely to fail on the merits because the State has a compelling interest to advance via its protocol and it does so via the least restrictive means.60 The Majority addressed each argument and found that Ramirez exhausted all options as required by the PLRA.61 Additionally, the Majority found that while the interests by the State were important and compelling, they were not the least restrictive means for securing those interests as required under RLUIPA.62
The Court first found that Ramirez did exhaust all available remedies before filing suit as required under the PLRA.63 While the State argued that filing suit was premature because the decision regarding the Step 2 grievance had not yet been decided, the Court found that Ramirez’s amended complaint, which was filed after the denial was issued, cured any defect that the original complaint may have caused.64 Additionally, the State argued that the request for audible prayer was not exhausted since that request was never explicitly stated in the grievances filed.65 The Court found that an explicit request for audible prayer was not necessary since the contents of the request implicitly expressed a desire for audible prayer, or else there would be no need to request the ability to pray if the pastor could do it silently.66
The second hurdle faced by Ramirez was showing that a preliminary injunction was necessary under the Winter factors.67 Of the four factors, the Court discussed three only briefly and found in favor of Ramirez.68 The first and most important factor is that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits.69 The Court started with the plaintiff’s burden, as required by the RLUIPA.70 The Majority found that Ramirez met his burden by showing his belief was sincerely held.71 This was primarily based on the evidence that what was requested was traditional to the practice of the religion.72
Once Ramirez met his burden, it shifted to the state to show the policy (1) furthers a compelling state interest, and (2) that the policy is narrowly tailored to that interest.73 The Majority found that for both requests—audible prayer and physical touch—the government did maintain a compelling interest.74 However, on both points, the Court found the blanket prohibition on both audible prayer and physical touch were not narrowly tailored to achieve these interests.75 Finally, the Court reinforced that this assessment was based on the specific facts of this case.76 While there may be future cases which call for such a policy, the Majority noted that the decision for a preliminary injunction is based on the specific facts of the case and not on future hypotheticals.77 The Court found that Ramirez had met the necessary requirements for a preliminary injunction and if the prison refused to allow the requests at the time of the execution, the District Court was instructed to provide the necessary relief.78
2. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter and did so on the grounds that Ramirez was not entitled to equitable relief and that he did not exhaust all the administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.79 Justice Thomas concluded that Ramirez was purposefully delaying his execution by filing appeals and requests for audible prayer and physical touch by the pastor in the chamber.80 Because of this gamesmanship, Justice Thomas determined that he should have been precluded from equitable relief.81 Second, Justice Thomas believed that all the possible administrative remedies were not exhausted by Ramirez.82 This was based primarily in Ramirez’s Step 1 grievance which did not include a specific request for audible prayer and therefore had not exhausted an administrative option.83 Therefore, Justice Thomas would have denied any equitable relief to Ramirez without addressing any questions concerning the policy and RLUIPA.84
V. COMMENT
Ramirez is not simply a case about the broad right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.85 Rather, this case is a more important win for incarcerated individuals and their ability to access the judicial system for complaints on their treatment and violations of their still guaranteed constitutional rights. In Ramirez, the Court turned toward a less rigorous standard for what it means to “exhaust” all the administrative remedies required.86 This is most clearly pointed out in Justice Thomas’s dissent.87 The crux of his disagreement with the majority of the Court hinged on the plaintiff’s requirements under the PLRA.88 Under Justice Thomas’s theory of justice in this case, the focus turns solely on a prisoner’s ability to correctly articulate the complaints he holds against the prison system.89 This is not the original intent of the PLRA.90 The Majority correctly understood the underlying complaint and likely constitutional violation against Ramirez and sought to remedy that complaint after Ramirez attempted to follow and exhaust all administrative guidelines.
The holding of Ramirez symbolizes a shift in the treatment of the incarcerated population. Rather than bar non-frivolous claims on technicalities, the Court sought to ensure justice as required by the State and, more importantly, to assure fairness in the justice process that happens post-verdict for the incarcerated. The burden on prisoners has been slightly lessened by Ramirez and is a small step in the direction of protecting prisoners’ rights and assuring their access to the justice system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall, Ramirez is an important step forward in ensuring all populations of the U.S. receive fair treatment and equity under the law by full access to the justice system. While the case itself is held in esteem for its religious protections, it is the de-emphasis on the strict application of the PLRA requirements which has the most significant effects on the lives of individuals, specifically those who are incarcerated and facing potential constitutional violations and other injustices while in the prison system.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Ivy A. Finkenstadt, Representing Prisoner Clients: Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 44-DEC Md. B.J. 58, 59 (2011).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Keri E. McCrary, Taking a Toll on the Equities: Governing the Effect of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement on State Statutes of Limitations, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 1321, 1325 (2013).
[5] 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a).
[6] Finkenstadt, supra note 1, at 60.
[7] Finkenstadt, supra note 1, at 59.
[8] Ramirez v. Collier, No. 21-5592, slip op. at 2 (2022).
[9] See Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court’s latest religion opinion should reassure liberals, Vox (Mar. 24, 2022, 1:30PM), https://www.vox.com/2022/3/24/22994540/supreme-court-religion-death-penalty-ramirez-collier-john-roberts-prison; Amy Howe, Court blocks execution, will weigh in on inmate’s religious-liberty claims, SCOTUSblog (Sep. 8, 2021 10:47PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/09/court-blocks-execution-will-weigh-in-on-inmates-religious-liberty-claims/.
[10] Ramirez, No. 21-5592 at 1.
[11] Id. at 2; Id. at 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[12] Id. at 2.
[13] Id. at 2.
[14] Id. at 2; Id. at 3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[15] Id. at 2.
[16] Id. at 2.
[17] Id. at 2.
[18] Id. at 2.
[19] Id. at 2.
[20] Id. at 2.
[21] Id. at 2.
[22] Id. at 2–3.
[23] Id. at 3.
[24] Id. at 3.
[25] Id. at 3.
[26] Id. at 3.
[27] Id. at 3-4. Under the PLRA, grievance systems are to be adopted by the state as an administrative process. These processes vary from state to state, but each outline the steps which must be taken by an incarcerated person before they may file a § 1983 claim in federal court. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e.
[28] Id. at 3.
[29] Id. at 4.
[30] Id. at 4.
[31] Id. at 5.
[32] Id. at 5.
[33] Id. at 5.
[34] Id. at 5.
[35] Id. at 5.
[36] Id. at 5.
[37] Id. at 5–6.
[38] Id. at 6.
[39] 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
[40] 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
[41] Ramirez v. Collier, No. 21-5592, slip op. at 1, 4 (2022).
[42] Winter v. Nat’l. Res. Def. Coun., Inc., 55 U.S. 7 (2008). The Winter factors are addressed infra note 53.
[43] 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
[44] Id.
[45] Know Your Rights: The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), (last updated Nov. 2002)chrome-extension://cefhlgghdlbobdpihfdadojifnpghbji/https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/images/asset_upload_file79_25805.pdf.
[46] 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a).
[47] 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
[48] Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 352 (2015) (“Under RLUIPA, the challenging party bears the initial burden of proving that his religious exercise is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief.”)
[49] See Ackerman v. Washington, 436 F.Supp.3d 1002, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 2020), aff’d 16 F.4th 170 (6th Cir. 2021) (“RLUIPA has been found to protect traditional rituals, such as the drinking of wine for a communion service, the annual powwow of Native Americans, and the consumption of specific traditional foods…”).
[50] 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); 42 § U.S.C. § 2000cc(a).
[51] See 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-2(b).
[52] Winter v. Nat’l. Res. Def. Coun., Inc., 55 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
[53] Id.
[54] Id.
[55] Id.
[56] Grasso Enterprises, LLC. V. Express Scripts, Inc., 809 F.3d 1033, 1040 (2016).
[57] Ramirez v. Collier, No. 21-5592, slip op. at 15 (2022).
[58] Id. at 7, 22.
[59] Id. at 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[60] Id. at 6, 12.
[61] Id. at 6.
[62] Id. at 12.
[63] Id. at 7.
[64] Id. at 8.
[65] Id.
[66] Id.
[67] Id. at 18.
[68] Id. at 18–19. These factors were that the harm was irreparable, the balance of the equities favored plaintiff, and the public interest favored plaintiff. Here, the harm was irreparable because without an injunction, Ramirez was unable to engage in a religious practice in the final moments of his life which has no pecuniary remedy. Additionally, the balance of the equities tipped in Ramirez’s favor because the request was narrowly tailored to the practice of his religion at the time of execution, not just an open-ended request for a stay, which also satisfied the public interest. Id.
[69] Ramirez, No. 21-5592, slip op. at 9–10; Winter v. Nat’l. Res. Def. Coun., Inc., 55 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
[70] Ramirez, No. 21-5592, slip op. at 10; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
[71] Ramirez, No. 21-5592, slip op. at 10.
[72] Id. at 10. The specific requests of laying hands and audible prayer are central and traditional to the Christian religion which Ramirez claimed to practice.
[73] Id. at 12; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a).
[74] Ramirez, No. 21-5592, slip op. at 12, 16.
[75] Id. at 14–16.
[76] Id. at 22.
[77] Id, at 15.
[78] Id. at 22.
[79] Id. at 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[80] Id. at 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[81] Id. at 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[82] Id. at 17 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[83] Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[84] Id. at 17 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[85] See Millhiser supra note 9 (“It was, in short, a ruling that prioritized religious liberty.”).
[86] Id. at 7–9.
[87] Id. at 17–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[88] Id. at 17 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[89] Id. at 17-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[90] See infra Section I.