By: Hannah Lucas
Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022)
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental constitutional right, enshrined within the Sixth Amendment.1 There are multiple stages of a criminal proceeding.2 First is the trial proceedings, which are considered a “critical stage” of a prosecution.3 Then there are post-conviction proceedings.4 During the post-conviction proceedings, those convicted of crimes have the ability to appeal or petition for habeas corpus relief.5 The right to effective assistance of counsel is not afforded to prisoners in state post-conviction proceedings.6 For individuals sentenced to death – such as David Ramirez and Barry Lee Jones – after exhausting their appeal, post-conviction proceedings are their last likely opportunity to escape their impending death sentences, which is why the right to effective assistance of counsel at this stage is critical.
In Shinn v. Ramirez, the United States Supreme Court evaluated whether federal courts could hold evidentiary hearings to develop the record because state post-conviction counsel was ineffective and failed to properly develop a record.7
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Petitioner, David Ramirez, was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for killing his girlfriend and her daughter and sentenced to death.8 Ramirez’s death sentence was affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court on direct review.9 In his first petition for state post-conviction relief, Ramirez raised multiple claims but did not raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for “failing to conduct a complete mitigation investigation” or for “obtaining and presenting available mitigation evidence at sentencing.”10 These claims were not raised until Ramirez’s second state habeas petition, which was denied for being untimely.11 Ramirez’s next attempt at relief was a federal habeas petition in an Arizona District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.12 The District Court held that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally defaulted because it was not raised in front of an Arizona state court in a timely manner.13
Despite the procedural default, the District Court allowed Ramirez to file evidence and declarations not presented in state court to support his request to excuse the procedural default.14 The District Court assessed this new evidence and excused the default but rejected the ineffective assistance claim on the merits.15 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that post-conviction counsel’s failure to raise and develop the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance or trial counsel was cause to forgive the procedural default.16 The Ninth Circuit further ruled that the underlying trial ineffective assistance of counsel claim was substantial, and therefore, Ramirez suffered prejudice.17 Instead of analyzing the merits of Ramirez’s claim, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further fact finding because Ramirez was entitled to develop evidence to litigate the merits of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.18
The second Petitioner, Barry Lee Jones, was convicted of sexual assault, three counts of child abuse, and felony murder.19 Jones was sentenced to death, which was affirmed on direct review.20 In his petition for state post-conviction relief, Jones alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but this allegation did not include the issue of trial counsel’s failure to conduct a sufficient trial investigation, which was at issue in the instant case.21 Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court denied relief.22 Jones then filed a federal habeas petition in an Arizona District Court.23 The District Court held that the trial ineffective assistance claim was procedurally defaulted.24
Like Ramirez, Jones argued his post-conviction counsel’s ineffective assistance should have been grounds to forgive the default and moved to supplement the state court’s undeveloped record.25 The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and decided to forgive the procedural default.26 The court held that on the merits, Jones’ trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.27 Arizona appealed this decision, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) did not permit the evidentiary hearing.28 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Section 2254 did not apply because Jones’ state post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to develop the state court record for the original ineffective assistance of counsel claim.29 The Ninth Circuit denied Arizona’s petition for rehearing.30
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the District Court was allowed to hold evidentiary hearings when the habeas petitioner claimed their state post-conviction counsel was ineffective, causing the state court record to be useless.31 The Court held that the federal habeas courts may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state court record based on the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.32
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused enjoys a number of rights, including the right to have the assistance of counsel.33 The right to counsel is vital to protect other fundamental rights during the criminal justice process such as the fundamental right to a fair trial.34
Federal habeas relief is meant as a last resort and has strict requirements that a prisoner must assert all their claims in state court before seeking federal relief.35 When a prisoner exhausts all the possible state court remedies, only then may a habeas claim be raised in federal court.36 The federal habeas court can only review the case based on the state-court record.37 The prisoner must also demonstrate that under the United States Supreme Court’s precedents, no “fairminded jurist” could have reached the same judgment as the state court.38
Even if a case is procedurally defaulted, federal courts may excuse the procedural default if a prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.39 A procedural default occurs when a claim has not been presented in state courts, which is required to be exhausted before federal review.40 Cause for the default is proven when the prisoner shows some objective, external factor impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rule, and prejudice is shown when the constitutional violation worked to the prisoner’s actual and substantial disadvantage.41
Under Murray v. Carrier, when the procedural default is due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment requires that the responsibility of the procedural default belongs to the state.42 Attorney error cannot establish cause to excuse a procedural default until it becomes a constitutional violation.43 In the instant case, this would require a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.44
Martinez v. Ryan was a case where the Court provided an exception to the Murray rule and said that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may provide cause to forgive procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance claim only if the state requires prisoners to raise such claims for the first time during state collateral proceedings.45 In other words, there must be a right to effective assistance of counsel, and that right must be violated for the federal district court to forgive the procedural default.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The decision was 6-3 with Justice Thomas writing the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.46 Justice Sotomayor wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan.47
1. Majority Opinion
Justice Thomas began the majority opinion by discussing the gruesome details of the crimes committed by petitioners Ramirez and Jones.48 The Court reasoned that Ramirez and Jones were procedurally defaulted from holding evidentiary hearings and to allow the U.S. District Court hold an evidentiary hearing would be against dual sovereignty and federalism ideals.49 Justice Thomas reasoned that the Founding Fathers left criminal law enforcement as one of the primary responsibilities of the state, and federal habeas review is an intrusion on this responsibility.50 The majority also mentioned the extensive costs on the state’s system that allowing the evidentiary hearings would expound, both on the state’s sovereign power and in the state’s economics by lessening the importance of the state’s investment in criminal trials.51
The Court also discussed that it would be “unseemly” for a federal district court to challenge a state court conviction without the state court first having the appropriate opportunity to correct a constitutional violation.52 The Court discussed how a federal court may excuse a potential procedural default, which can happen only in narrow circumstances.53 In these cases, the prisoner must demonstrate cause of the default and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.54 The Court rejected both Ramirez’s and Jones’s argument that ineffective assistance of counsel during post-conviction proceedings can serve as the constitutional violation in itself to establish cause because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.55
Justice Thomas reasoned that because the blame for not developing the state-court record is attributed to the prisoner, even with ineffective post-conviction of counsel, to develop evidence beyond the state record they must meet the requirements of Section 2254(e)(2) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).56 Because both Ramirez and Jones did not satisfy these requirements, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was reversed.57
2. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor began her dissent by criticizing the Court’s opinion for constricting the right to effective counsel and leaving those convicted based on ineffective representation constrained and subject to harsh punishments.58 She discussed the ruling, calling it illogical that the Court would fault prisoners for their ineffective counsel’s actions during post-conviction proceedings.59 In the dissenter’s view, there was nothing within the AEDPA, Section 2254, or Supreme Court precedent to require this result as the Majority asserted.60
Justice Sotomayor detailed the specifics of the alleged ineffective post-conviction counsel for both Jones and Ramirez.61 This included failure to investigate, which would have uncovered medical evidence that could have potentially exonerated Jones.62 For Ramirez, this included post-conviction counsel’s failure to argue that trial counsel was ineffective due to a failure to develop and present mitigating sentencing evidence.63
Justice Sotomayor stated that under the Court’s precedent in Martinez and Trevino, the petitioners were not at fault for the failure to raise these claims in state court.64 The dissent reasoned that because those holdings provide that a petitioner cannot be at fault for failing to bring a claim due to post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, it cannot logically follow that the petitioner would be at fault for ineffective counsel’s failure to develop an evidentiary basis.65 She found that placing blame on the petitioner for the negligent attorney’s actions in one situation but not another was not rational.66 Finally, she stated that the Majority misinterpreted precedent and the purpose of AEDPA and was incorrect to prioritize state court deference over constitutional protections.67
V. COMMENT
It seems illogical that the Court would allow American citizens to be potentially executed because of procedural issues caused by negligent counsel.68 The right to effective assistance of counsel is an important constitutional safeguard designed to prevent individuals from receiving harsh punishments as a result of unfair judicial processes.69
As a result of this ruling, mass amounts of people who were convicted and have real claims of innocence will miss out on opportunities to have their case reviewed.70 There remains the possibility for claims of innocence to be raised under AEDPA, but there are multiple issues with this remedy.71 First, the burden remains on the petitioner for their counsel’s ineffective assistance, leaving the petitioners to find the evidence,72 and also that the standard is so high that no one can reasonably meet it.73
Those convicted of crimes must now ensure their state post-conviction motions are being handled by competent counsel, which is not a guarantee for those unable to afford representation, especially without constitutional protections and mandates for it.74 Many of these petitions are filed by inmates themselves, who lack the knowledge of the law necessary to bring these claims properly.75 A major tenet of the criminal justice system is equal treatment under the law, which is why there is a constitutional right to effective counsel.76 Being able to maneuver the justice system is integral to democracy, and it is not fair to have a system where only those who can afford effective representation are given the full benefit of judicial process.77
However, the opinion does not prevent the claim from being argued in federal court, it just disallows new evidence to be developed unless the exceptions within the AEDPA are met.78 Evidence for these claims likely would not be included in the state court’s record because there is not an opportunity to present it with inadequate counsel.79 Thus, these cases would likely fail without more development of the evidentiary record.80
The right to effective counsel in post-conviction proceedings is a life-or-death issue for David Ramirez and Barry Lee Jones. No matter the gruesome details of the crime, everyone deserves fair and just adjudication, which is not what Ramirez and Jones received here. The decision in Shinn v. Ramirez was decided on party lines,81 and it is troublesome that legal and logical reasoning had to fall behind party values. As Justice Sotomayor detailed in her dissent, the decision is “perverse” and relies on reasoning that misconstrues precedent and is derived from dissenting opinions.82 With so much at stake in this case, the Court chose an interesting time to crack down on dual sovereignty within the criminal justice system.
In prior opinions, the Court has made special considerations and narrowed the application of their decisions in capital cases.83 Even if the Court found it necessary to prevent federal overreach in state criminal cases, it could have taken a route of providing evidentiary hearings only in cases involving a death sentence. It could create extra cost to extend the right to effective counsel to all post-conviction proceedings, but it seems necessary for those who are about to pay the ultimate punishment. It could be argued that extending constitutional protections for effective assistance of counsel to post conviction proceedings would be create a strenuous burden of proof, making the protections inconsequential, but this has become a life-or-death issue. Not only do constitutional protections establish what the government deems important but having an extra opportunity to evade the death penalty would be worth it for those facing the ultimate punishment.
Allowing a death sentence to continue when there is evidence of ineffective trial counsel just because the post-conviction counsel was also ineffective and failed to create an evidentiary record seems to contradict the purpose of truth in the justice system. Instead, two men will pay the ultimate price for the mistakes of post-conviction habeas counsel.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Shinn v. Ramirez places fault on criminal defendants for their ineffective counsel’s actions due to the lack of Sixth Amendment protection in post-conviction proceedings.84 This case creates a burden on those filing habeas petitions to ensure they have competent counsel and are developing a record during the appropriate stage because otherwise they can default on future claims.85 For David Ramirez and Barry Lee Jones, their claims of ineffective assistance of counsel will have to rely on the sparse records left by their ineffective attorneys, and Ramirez and Jones will likely have to face the reality of being put to death. Competent counsel is a fundamental right, and faulting prisoners for their incompetent counsel’s actions is counterintuitive to that right.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. Const. amend. VI.
[2] Stages of a Criminal Trial, Justia.com, https://www.justia.com/criminal/procedure/stages-criminal-case/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2022).
[3] Critical stages of proceedings, Law.cornell.edu, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/critical_stages_of_proceedings#:~:text=Further%20cases%20have%20concluded%20that,and%20some%20pre%2Dtrial%20hearings (last visited Nov. 4, 2022).
[4] What Is Post Conviction?, National Post-Conviction Project, https://postconviction.org/what-is-post-conviction/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CPost%2DConviction%E2%80%9D%20defined%3A,of%20guilty%20or%20no%2Dcontest. (last visited Nov. 5, 2022).
[5] Id.
[6] Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1735 (2022).
[7] Id. at 1730.
[8] Id. at 1728.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. Mitigation evidence is often presented in capital cases to argue that the defendant should not receive a death sentence. Mitigation in Capital Cases, Capital Punishment in Context, https://capitalpunishmentincontext.org/issues/mitigation#:~:text=Mitigation%2C%20also%20referred%20to%20as,not%20receive%20a%20death%20sentence (last visited Nov. 5, 2022).
[11] Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1728.
[12] Id at 1729. Section 2254 allows for state cases to seek habeas relief in federal courts, after exhausting state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018).
[13] Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1729.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Id. at 1729–30.
[27] Id. at 1730.
[28] Id.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] Id. at 1734.
[33] U.S. Const. amend. VI.
[34] Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
[35] Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1731–32.
[36] Id. at 1732.
[37] Id.
[38] Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
[39] Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1733.
[40] Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 2012).
[41] Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1733.
[42] Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
[43] Id.
[44] Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1733.
[45] Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).
[46] Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1718.
[47] Id. at 1740. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
[48] Id. at 1728–30.
[49] Id. at 1739–40.
[50] Id. at 1730–31.
[51] Id. at 1731.
[52] Id. at 1732.
[53] Id. at 1733.
[54] Id.
[55] Id. at 1733–35.
[56] Id. at 1735.
[57] Id. at 1740.
[58] Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
[59] Id.
[60] Id.
[61] Id. at 1741.
[62] Id.
[63] Id. at 1742.
[64] Id. at 1743.
[65] Id.
[66] Id.
[67] Id. at 1748.
[68] Id. at 1740.
[69] Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
[70] Christina Swarns, Innocence Project Statement From Executive Director Christina Swarns on Shinn v. Ramirez and Jones, Innocence Project (May 24, 2022), https://innocenceproject.org/innocence-project-statement-from-executive-director-christina-swarns-on-shinn-v-ramirez-and-jones/.
[71] 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018).
[72] Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1735
[73] AEDPA: Why Bother Federalizing?, Sixth District Appellte Program, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/http://www.sdap.org/downloads/seminar/aedpa.pdf
[74] Don’t panic over Shinn v Ramirez… but also make sure to hire competent State habeas counsel, Pullan & Young (May 30, 2022), https://www.texascriminalappeals.law/dont-panic-over-shinn-v-ramirez-but-also-make-sure-to-hire-competent-state-habeas-counsel/.
[75] Id.
[76] See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984).
[77] See Swarns, supra note 71.
[78] Don’t panic over Shinn v Ramirez… but also make sure to hire competent State habeas counsel, supra note 75.
[79] Don’t panic over Shinn v Ramirez… but also make sure to hire competent State habeas counsel, Pullan & Young (May 30, 2022), https://www.texascriminalappeals.law/dont-panic-over-shinn-v-ramirez-but-also-make-sure-to-hire-competent-state-habeas-counsel/.
[80] Id.
[81] Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022).
[82] Id. at 1740–48 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
[83] See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998).
[84] Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1735.
[85] Id. at 1733–35.