Category: Missouri Supreme Court

In State ex rel. Grooms v. Privette, Betty Grooms petitioned the Supreme Court of Missouri for a writ of mandamus and prohibition to terminate a proceeding against her for contempt of court. The request for relief stems from a court order entered by Judge Steven A. Privette directing Grooms, the elected circuit court clerk, to prepare a spreadsheet of court costs assessed in criminal cases in Oregon County for a set period of time. After multiple unsatisfied attempts to provide the requested information, Privette ordered Grooms to show cause as to why she should not be held in contempt of court. The Supreme Court of Missouri issued a preliminary writ barring Privette from proceeding with the contempt action, which was subsequently made permanent in the instant case.

 In Morgan, the party seeking to compel arbitration initially defended the lawsuit as if there was no arbitration agreement. Almost eight months after the lawsuit was filed, the party moved to compel arbitration under the FAA.  The Court of Appeals found that the nonmoving party would not be prejudiced by arbitrating the case and sent the case to arbitration.  On appeal, the Supreme Court found that by requiring a showing of prejudice, the Court of Appeals created an arbitration-specific rule, which was contrary to the FAA.

 What should have been a normal suppression motion has turned into a holding that has broad implications for defendants during crisis negotiations. The Court in Reuter listed certain factors to analyze in standoff-specific situations that are different from normal Miranda factors. In doing so, the Court nitpicks certain factors to analyze while ignoring others. Moreover, the Court missed an opportunity to apply the public safety exception created in Quarles.

There is no dispute that a criminal trial with every member of the trial present including the judge, defendant, attorneys, and witnesses best serves the interests of fairness and justice.  However, what should a trial judge do when a witness is sick or at higher risk of contracting a severe case of COVID-19 and cannot testify in court? Can the Confrontation Clause and the defendant’s rights be satisfied in ways other than having the witness appear in trial in front of the defendant?

The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, along with its sister requirement in the Missouri Constitution, is a vital component of our Bill of Rights.  It protects against unreasonable government intrusion into the private lives of citizens.  Requiring a warrant to describe with particularity the things to be searched and seized further ensures against unreasonable intrusion.  But a recent Missouri case has shaken up the details of the Missouri warrant requirement.  

In 2018, the Missouri General Assembly enacted a law to “Raise the Age” for automatically trying certain juveniles as adults within the criminal system.  For T.J., a seventeen-year-old in Missouri, and for many juvenile service providers, this law was the subject of confusion due to an ambiguity within the law regarding the effective date.  The Supreme Court of Missouri had to resolve this dispute to clarify which law was applicable to T.J. and when the jurisdiction of the juvenile division was actually broadened.

 The COVID-19 pandemic forced courts to adopt procedures in light of the public health crisis.  In large part, this meant extremely limiting in-person proceedings and utilizing video conferencing software.  However, the pandemic did not allow the suspension or restriction of an individual’s constitutional rights in criminal cases.

“Rhoden’s place in the history of Missouri medical malpractice reform and the subsequent amendment of the statute to require intentional conduct by healthcare providers to sustain a punitive damages award is in the best interest of Missouri healthcare—a state with a shortage of physicians and a history of medical malpractice insurance dilemmas.”